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sume that the PSR-denying claim, ~E: There is no explanation for the truth of
P and so no causal explanation for P, is also contingently true. (Note: Pruss
employs only the second conjunct in what I have called ~E; however, he
derives it from the first.) Let W1 be a possible world in which the conjunction, P and ~E, is true. Since this conjunction is, if true, contingently true,
there is a possible world, W2, in which it false. The Brouwer axiom tells us
that if a claim is true, then necessarily it is possibly true. So, from the Brouwer axiom it follows that in W2, though P and ~E is false, it is nonetheless
possibly true. Given Aristotelian modal views, if P and ~E is possibly true
in W2 then some thing or things in W2 must have causal powers capable
of bringing about the truth of P and ~E. But, it is impossible for anything
to cause it to be the case that an uncaused state of affairs obtains. So, the
affirmation of the PSR-denying ~E, together with an Aristotelian account
of modality results in an absurdity. It follows that it is not possible that the
Aristotelian modal view be true and PSR false.
Nor is it possible in a brief review to describe adequately the richness of
Pruss’s work. It exemplifies analytical rigor and invites continued reflection.
Anyone interested in PSR owes Alexander R. Pruss a debt of gratitude.1
1
Thanks to Douglas Groothuis and Mark Linville for very helpful comments on earlier
drafts of the review.

Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays, by C. Stephen Evans.
Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006. Pp. 352. $49.95 (hardback).
Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations, by C.
Stephen Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004/2006 (paper). Pp.
376. $195.00 (hardback), $45.00 (paper).
MYRON BRADLEY PENNER, Prairie College
These two books represent the culmination of decades of reading Kierke
gaard’s texts and philosophical reflection on them.1 They offer both a defense of the relevance of Kierkegaard to philosophy today and a polemic
against various (mis)readings of Kierkegaard. Evans is one of few analytic
philosophers who sees value in Kierkegaard’s thought and who has patiently and carefully spent time in the Kierkegaardian texts. As a result,
he has produced a substantial body of work over some thirty years that
brings Kierkegaard’s thought to bear not only on issues in philosophy
of religion, but the wider questions of contemporary analytic philosophy
as well. Both these books warrant close reading by anyone interested in
1
For simplicity, both Evans and I use the term “Kierkegaard” to refer to the body of
thought presented in the texts historically written by Søren Kierkegaard, whether pseudonymous or not. This is not to overlook the immense importance of pseudonymity but to
simplify reference.
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contemporary philosophical debates, especially in philosophy of religion
and moral philosophy (ethics and meta-ethics). However, those interested
in the methods and themes of continental philosophy and how Kierkegaard’s texts appear in light of them will find little in Evans’s work but a
sustained argument against continental interpretations of Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard On Faith and the Self
Kierkegaard On Faith and the Self conveniently presents in one volume a
wide-ranging collection of seventeen of Evans’s most important essays
on Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion, ethical and meta-ethical thought
previously published between 1979 and 2000 (with minor changes), and
arranged into four groups: “Kierkegaard the Philosopher” (Part Two), “Kierkegaard on Faith, Reason, and Reformed Epistemology” (Part Three),
“Kierkegaard on Ethics and Authority” (Part Four), and “Kierkegaard on
the Self: Philosophical Psychology” (Part Five). There are also two new essays that bookend the re-published material, the Introduction, “Kierkegaard as a Christian Thinker” (Part One), and the Conclusion, “Where Can
Kierkegaard Take Us?” (Part Six), giving the book its shape and telos.
Taken as a whole they offer, Evans argues, “the kernel” of a “way of reading Kierkegaard” that is consistent and unified, though initially written
without any such “detailed plan of attack” (p. x).
The first thing to say about this collection of essays is that each one is
well-written, well-argued and deserves closer attention than can be given
to them here. One of Evans’s virtues as a philosopher is his ability to bring
clarity to Kierkegaard’s rather complex authorship. The result may be
slightly misleading, however, to readers unfamiliar with the primary texts
themselves. On consultation they may find the issues less straightforward
than they appear in Evans’s hands. Kierkegaard is an enigmatic writer at
best and often there are good textual and philosophical reasons for the
various uses to which he is put. Fortunately Evans is well aware of this
fact and generally does not present his reading as the only possible way to
understand Kierkegaard; it is simply the best one he can discern.
The collective aim of these essays is to correct “deeply rooted traditions of misinterpretation” of Kierkegaard’s texts that cause so many readers to labor under “the illusion that they already understand him” (p. 5).
More to the point, Evans seeks to rebut the entrenched interpretations of
Kierkegaard as an irrationalist fideist about faith and reason, a relativist
about propositional truth, a subjectivist about moral norms, a nonfoundationalist about epistemic justification, and an anti-realist about truth,
language and metaphysics. These misinterpretations, Evans suggests, distort Kierkegaard’s texts and ultimately undermine his status as both “a
serious philosopher” and “perhaps the greatest Christian thinker since
the middle ages” (p. 8), one whose thought is deeply relevant to our contemporary world, sacred and secular (pp. 4–5, 26).
Evans’s thesis maintains that Kierkegaard is first and foremost a
Christian thinker, and that as a Christian thinker he makes an important
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contribution to wider philosophical thought. Ironically, Kierkegaard’s
Christianity is not something one may take for granted in Kierkegaardian
circles, even though most of Kierkegaard’s authorship is focused explicitly on Christian themes. The existential subjectivist-irrationalist readings
of Kierkegaard promulgated by philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre,2
and the so-called “postmodern” literary-ironist readings of someone like
Roger Poole,3 saddle Kierkegaard with the view that grounds for one’s beliefs are utterly subjective (or “emotive,” as MacIntyre would have it) and
irrational and, as Poole claims, that the Kierkegaardian texts offer nothing
by way of propositional truths or doctrines. On the former view, Kierkegaard advances theses that ultimately have no rational basis, while on the
latter he advances no theses whatsoever. In both cases Kierkegaard is an
anti-philosopher who wittingly or not undercuts the basis for Christian
belief, rendering him either a (philosophically) useless Christian thinker
or not really a Christian thinker at all. These are the sorts of readings Evans means to quash.
Philosophically, the lynchpin of Evans’s way of reading Kierkegaard,
which we encounter in Chapters Two and Three, is the claim that Kierkegaard is a realist who not only believes in the possibility of metaphysics, but
is himself engaged in a metaphysical project of sorts. Kierkegaard is “uncompromisingly on the side of realism” if by that one means Kierkegaard
believes that there is objective truth independent of human minds (pp. 9,
56–58). And Kierkegaard is a metaphysician if we think of metaphysics in
terms set forth by William James as “an attempt to clarify a person’s deepest beliefs about what is real, those beliefs that both stem from and shape
a person’s actual life-choices”—what Evans calls “mere metaphysics” (pp.
9, 49; 49–51, 58). These claims both hinge on Evans’s realist interpretation
of Kierkegaard’s “truth is subjectivity” (his subjectivity principle) which
applies, first, only to moral and religious truth, and second, to the truth
of a person’s life and not to propositional truth (p. 58). So far from being a
subjectivist about propositional truth, Kierkegaard’s subjectivity principle
actually presupposes the objective (realist) truth of propositions. Kierkegaard’s oft-alleged anti-metaphysical texts turn out merely to assert that a
person’s spiritual and inward development is essential to the discovery
of metaphysical truth (pp. 10, 62–65). Thus the way is opened for a Kierkegaardian epistemology that is (in Chapters Ten and Eleven) a form
of modest foundationalism, a Kierkegaardian ethics that is not a form of
relativism (Chapters Twelve and Thirteen), and a view of the self that is
normative (Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen).
Thankfully, Evans’s insistence that Kierkegaard is not a wild-eyed religious fanatic who jettisons reason altogether has now become, largely
2
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981), pp. 39–50.
3
Roger Poole, “The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth Century Receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. A. Hannay and G. Marino (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 66ff.
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because of Evans’s work collected in this anthology, a rather standard
reading of Kierkegaard’s so-called subjectivity principle. Furthermore,
one hopes that other philosophers heed Evans’s admonition (Chapter
Nineteen) that Kierkegaard’s thought is particularly germane to our increasingly postmodern times. But there are questions about Evans’s approach to Kierkegaard. For starters, Evans habitually collapses metaphysical questions to their epistemological dimensions, privileging epistemic
over hermeneutical reflection, in order to demonstrate how it is that what
Kierkegaard actually opposes are certain modern epistemic assumptions,
such as infallibilism, classical foundationalism and unmediated access to
reality as it “really” is, etc. Thus, all the statements in the Kierkegaardian
texts that appear radical are, once Evans is through, really just affirming
what is (now) generally acceptable to the philosophical mainstream in
analytic philosophy.
A good example of this is when Evans feels he must rescue Kierkegaard from antirealism—a view which, as Evans himself admits, encompasses a range of positions on the nature of reality and its relation to human cognition—lest Kierkegaard collapse back into the irrationalist and
anti-Christian (mis)readings of him. Antirealism, however, may mean
anything from a nonfactualist view, according to which the propositions
or sentences of a discourse do not express genuine predicative judgments
and make no claim about the world (or some external state of affairs) so
that no claim about the world could render them true or false, to a perspectival view which holds only that for any proposition p we assert as
true, the conditions under which “that p” is true are contextual and limited to the perspective from which it is made. The former Evans no doubt
wishes to avoid, but why the latter? Evans circumvents the antirealist
charge by (among other things) defining the sort of metaphysics Kierkegaard opposes as focused on its presumed epistemic status, and not the
object of study for metaphysics. That is, Kierkegaard certainly rejects some
forms of metaphysical inquiry—such as Plato’s or Hegel’s—but he does
so, Evans claims, only because of the presumed epistemic status of their
metaphysical claims, and not because they engage in metaphysics simpliciter. There are textual reasons to challenge this notion, but even a realist
might be forgiven for feeling a bit cheated when she discovers that all
Evans apparently means by calling Kierkegaard a realist is that Kierkegaard is interested in metaphysics (and truth) in the “Jamesean sense” that
seeks to elucidate our actual life commitments. Kierkegaard’s metaphysics has “no hint of finality or certainty, no claim to absolute knowledge but
rather a confession that theoretical evidence is not decisive” (p. 51). James
certainly was no friend to anything like traditional metaphysics insofar
as it inquires into the nature of Being or Reality as it really is, and could
be quite comfortable instead with a form of discourse that focuses merely
on Being/Reality-as-it-comes-to-us. Generally this works as an account
of the status of metaphysics in Kierkegaard’s thought, but is this what
characterizes metaphysical inquiry generally? Historically? Rejecting
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Nagel’s famous “view from nowhere” and admitting that the kinds of
truths available to humans are of a second-order is not tantamount to
heresy or philosophical suicide. What is more, Kierkegaard’s subjectivity
principle sits quite comfortably in some of these kinds of perspectival versions of antirealism. I therefore see no reason why one could not continue
to understand Kierkegaard as a Christian whose thought has continuing
philosophical relevance while eschewing a realist metaphysics. As a matter of fact, Kierkegaard’s relevance to postmodernity in particular might
be even greater.
We find another typical example of Evans’s method of collapsing metaphysical questions into epistemological ones when he writes:
If we ask why Kierkegaard believes in an objective reality as what knowledge attempts to approximate, the answer seems to be that this is part of
the structure of belief or faith. That is just what a belief is or does, The mind
independent character of reality is precisely what gives belief its risky character. Belief is just the human attitude that takes this risk and takes what
is apprehended as real. . . . Kierkegaard seems to be of the opinion, shared
by Hume and Reid and Moore, that certain kinds of beliefs are just natural
though perhaps not inevitable; they are called forth by life itself. Skepticism
is difficult; one must work to be a skeptic. (p. 44)

Evans is surely correct here, as far as he goes. Surprisingly, Evans quickly
skips from the fact that in Kierkegaard’s texts belief (or faith) is a natural
cognitive disposition to the conclusion that such beliefs entail a full-blown
metaphysics of precisely how it is that their propositional expressions are
true (i.e., “objective,” “realist,” etc.). Evans takes the approximate knowledge of objective reality and objectively risky character of belief in the
Kierkegaardian texts to affirm the objective certainty of the existence of
the external world and the realist interpretation of the mind-/languageworld connection. In all this Evans dismisses the fact that, first, Kierkegaard’s position might be compatible with a version of alethic realism (to
use Alston’s term) that does not require that the notion of objective truth
be drawn out in a metaphysically robust way, and, second, the ultimate
aim of the Kierkegaardian subjectivity principle is to point the reader away
from these sorts of philosophical accounts in the first place. Kierkegaard
does not exhibit a lot of interest in making the objects of our beliefs, especially Christianity, any easier or safer or more comfortable for his readers,
though his goal is not to make it more difficult than it really is. He seems
rather to emphasize that such abstract pieces of philosophical reasoning
only end uncertainty and that living well requires a different philosophical approach—one that begins and ends with the concerns of oneself as a
subject. None of this means that Evans is wrong about Kierkegaard per
se, or that his reading lacks a high degree of explanatory cogency, but it
does provide a warning that we might be moving away from precisely
the approach to Kierkegaard’s texts which render their rich philosophical
insights most edifying.

book reviews

103

Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love
Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love picks up and develops at book-length one of the
main conclusions of Kierkegaard On Faith and Self, namely that Kierkegaard’s thought has importance for Christian ethics insofar as it provides
the basic resources for an account of how an ethic of duty can be linked to
an ethic of virtue by way of divine command theory. Evans has two primary concerns in Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love. The first is to develop, examine, and evaluate the view that moral obligations depend on God found
in the writings of Kierkegaard (pp. 5–6). The second is to show how this
view of moral obligations, while rooted in religious faith, contributes to
a pluralistic society without compromising its convictions (p. 7). In regard to the first matter, Evans’s Kierkegaardian account follows Robert
Adams in claiming that moral obligations are grounded in the commands
of a good, loving God, particularly the command to love God and one’s
neighbor as oneself. The classic question here is, then (as per the Euthyphro dilemma), how one parses out moral obligations in reference to God:
Does the normativity of God’s commands inhere in God’s being or in the
goodness of what is commanded? As to the second issue, Evans argues
that his Kierkegaardian divine command theory demonstrates how moral
obligations can be objective, overriding and universal in the double sense
that all persons in a pluralistic society, whether religious or not, are subject to them, and that all persons must be treated equally (because of the
command to love one’s neighbor) in a pluralistic society, regardless of age,
race, gender or creed.
Evans argues that Kierkegaard’s version of moral obligations, by rooting God’s commands in God’s broader teleological vision of the good,
shows just how wrong-headed typical charges of arbitrariness are to divine commands (p. 9). Such a theory of divine commands, grounded in
the preeminent command to love one’s neighbor as oneself, is humanistic
in that it understands moral obligations as successfully directed towards
human flourishing, thus effectively linking deontological and aretaic approaches (p. 300). For Evans, Kierkegaard’s conception of the self as a
spiritual and moral agent enables “him to import a Kantian dimension to
what seems formally to be an Aristotelian framework” (p. 22). Thus the
ethical task for each person is the Aristotelian goal of becoming oneself,
but the self one must become is the self God commands one to become
(p. 23). Personal happiness and flourishing, for Kierkegaard, cannot be
defined purely or even mainly in terms of Aristotle’s natural goods. Ultimately human flourishing is measured by an individual’s spiritual and
moral development. As such, human flourishing and self-development
are inextricably bound to one’s relation to God and requires obedience
and the crucial passions of faith and love.
There are three features of this account that recommend it to a pluralistic
society, despite its overtly Christian character. First, the command to love,
while grounded (because of sin) in special revelation, is also promulgated
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by general revelation through human moral conscience. Thus all humans
encounter the call of God to love the neighbor, however distorted this may
be because of sin, and such a divine command can commend itself even to
humans who do not accept such a revelation (pp. 161–162, 301). Second, as
Kierkegaard unpacks the command to neighbor-love, it provides a non-ad
hoc egalitarian basis for ethics. God is “the middle term” in every genuine
case of neighbor-love and thereby provides the foundation for human love.
Thus, in neighbor-love the other is construed through the infinite equality
of God’s love for his creation and in the unconditional solidarity of being
God’s children (pp. 113, 300). Third, Evans presents this Kierkegaardian
account of moral obligation as outstripping the naturalistic alternatives by
providing what they cannot; namely a satisfactory account of why such
natural desires for dominance should not legitimize the victimization of
others, why human persons should be obligated to those unable to contribute to society, and why we cannot seriously maintain that racists and
successful criminals are merely mistaken (Chapters Ten–Twelve).
This book is important for several reasons, but one of the chief reasons
is its polemic (found primarily in Chapter Three) against the standard account of Kierkegaardian ethics and the (in)famous “teleological suspension
of the ethical,” shifting the focus of Kierkegaard’s ethics away from Fear and
Trembling and on to Works of Love where it should be. “The point of [Fear
and Trembling],” Evans helpfully reminds us, “is not to help us get clearer
about ethics, but to help us get clearer about faith” (p. 75). The main point
of Fear and Trembling and its suspension of the ethical is to call into question
the identification of faith, which is about “the absolute,” with ethics, which
is closely identified with Hegel’s sittlichkeit—the ethical duties people have
by virtue of their concrete social relations (pp. 69, 83). For a positive account
of ethical life one must look instead to Works of Love, which is written later
under Kierkegaard’s own name, as opposed to the pseudonymous Fear and
Trembling, as it gives specific content to the formal accounts of the ethical
given in the earlier works (p. 111).
Evans has made a provocative and powerful contribution to meta-ethics
by showing how Kierkegaard’s thought may help us bring ethical approaches that understand moral obligations in terms of duty together with virtue
approaches, united under a divine command theory. Once again, however,
Evans has creatively deployed the concepts involved. In the section in which
he argues that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Climacus is a deontologist, Evans also tells us that what he means by this is that Climacus’ ethics focuses
on duty rather than simply achieving good consequences (p. 99). Evans further clarifies that his emphasis on deontology is not meant to focus on actions rather than the achievement of character in moral assessment (p. 99n).
But isn’t this precisely the point of difference between virtue and traditional deontological theories of moral obligation? It is not, after all, as
if Aristotle and especially Aquinas would be surprised by the suggestion
that moral obligations could be packaged in the form of commands. What
is at issue for Kant and his ilk is precisely the orientation of duty towards
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the contingent imperatives of human flourishing as opposed to the intrinsic nature of actions. This comes even clearer into view when one brings
divine commands into play, as the command of God immediately implies
that actions are, in fact, not intrinsically good—a point which generates the
Euthyphro dilemma in the first place. From an overtly Christian perspective, such as Evans’s Kierkegaardian one, the motivation to understand
moral obligations in fundamentally deontological terms is lost. As Evans
has developed Kierkegaard’s position, God gives us commands (which
really amount to just one) so that we love God, as opposed to merely obey,
and thereby fulfill our telos as individuals created by God. This is precisely how Evans sidesteps traditional objections to divine command theory,
but this is essentially a version of Aquinas’ answer as well. Subsequently,
I doubt whether Evans will change the mind of anyone who comes to the
book staunchly committed to a virtue approach to moral norms, but they
may find new and creative ways to articulate and defend their position.
Conclusion
In both books Evans is a careful and appreciative, but at times critical,
interpreter of Kierkegaard, who capably brings Kierkegaard’s thought to
bear on contemporary issues in philosophy. Evans remains conscious that
he is offering us a particular reading of Kierkegaard and that no reading of
Kierkegaard—including his—is incontestable. The result is a Kierkegaard
whose views cannot be ignored by analytic philosophers interested in contemporary questions in philosophy of religion, ethics and meta-ethics.

Persons: Human and Divine, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. viii + 380 pages, $99.00 hardback, $35.00 paperback.
C. G. WEAVER, Chicago State University, Northern Illinois University
All essays within this anthology appear for the very first time, save section
one of Alvin Plantinga’s “Materialism and Christian Belief.” Dean Zimmerman’s introduction provides a succinct and insightful discussion of
theology and its relationship to analytic philosophy (particularly analytic
metaphysics). He explains how analytic philosophy is no longer the enemy of theology, and then just before summarizing each chapter, remarks
that the spirit of the volume is very much in line with analytic philosophy
that is the friend of theology.
Idealism
The more substantive portion of the volume starts with a rather interesting section on Idealism. In “Idealism Vindicated,” Robert Adams explains
that one of the main reasons why Idealism is currently rejected by many

